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Résumé 
L’objectif principal de cet article est de rendre compte, du point de vue de la dé-
mographie, de la transformation du discours néolibéral sur l’immigration dans le 
contexte de la crise économique en Europe. Pour ce faire, l’article analyse, outre 
les sources secondaires pertinentes, les rapports annuels sur les risques globaux 
que le World Economic Forum a parrainé depuis 2006 jusqu’en 2015, afin de mesu-
rer l’évolution d’un discours qui forge la perception des évolutions démographi-
ques, et parmi elles la migration considérée comme un des risques majeurs à iden-
tifier, gérer et contrôler pour assurer une gouvernance mondiale. L’étude de ces 
rapports montre d’abord l’importance grandissante et dramatique que prend l’évo-
lution démographique – à la fois en volume et en structure – au fur et à mesure de 
l’enfoncement dans la récession économique. Ensuite, la conception des migrations 
a connu un changement radical, présentées d’abord comme un problème puis 
comme une solution. Enfin, le discours néolibéral sur la gouvernance exprimée 
dans les mêmes termes que la gestion d’entreprise fait une nouvelle interprétation 
du concept de «résilience» et l’applique à des populations spécifiques. 
Mots-clés 
Démographie, migrations, risque global, résilience, néolibéralisme. 
Abstract 
The chief aim of this article is to give an account, from the standpoint of demogra-
phy, of the transformation of neoliberal discourse on immigration since the onset 
of the economic crisis in Europe. The Global Risks reports published by the World 
Economic Forum from 2006 through to 2015 are analysed here, together with per-
tinent secondary sources, in order to gauge changes in a type of discourse that has 
been shaping perceptions of the evolution of population and, among related phe-
nomena, migration as a major risk to be identified, managed and monitored in 
order to ensure global governance. Study of the reports shows, first, a progressive 
emphasis on demographic evolution as problematic – in terms of both volume and 
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structure – as the economic recession has worsened. Second, the conceptualisation 
of migration has simultaneously undergone radical change in which it went from 
being a problem to becoming a solution. Finally, neoliberal discourse on governabil-
ity, expressed in terms of business management, has reinterpreted the concept of 
«resilience» and applied it to specific populations. 
Key words 
Demography, migrations, global risk, resilience, neoliberalism. 
Demography, migrations and discourse analysis 
The chief aim of this article is to analyse, from the standpoint of demog-
raphy, neoliberal discourse on migration since the onset of the economic 
crisis. If globalisation brought growth, acceleration and diversification 
of migratory flows, together with challenges presented by settling im-
migrant populations in host countries worldwide – all of which was re-
flected in growing interest in the matter and the proclaimed need for a 
political approach – the positions adopted in attempts at explaining mi-
gration seem to have been changing since the economic recession began. 
The focus on migration as a risk, within the theoretical framework of the 
Risk Society, is being substantially modified in favour of an increasing 
resort to the concept of resilience, which has been re-elaborated as a 
way of classifying populations along the business management ap-
proach and its use. 
The eminently empirical nature of demography certainly works in its 
favour, giving it more credibility than other disciplines more subjected 
to speculation. Nonetheless, it is also at a disadvantage in being used all 
too often as an actuarial science by other disciplines with accredited 
theoretical baggage in order to analyse population statistics, to such an 
extent that there is a danger that the discipline of demography is disre-
garded, even when the discussion concerns intrinsically demographic 
matters. Before claiming that this is the result of intrusion, or blaming 
professionals who see demography as an exclusively applied form of 
knowledge, one should recognise that, since its very beginnings, it has 
been run through by two opposing axes. First is its vocation as a social 
science as opposed to that of policy-oriented science, as Dennis Hodgson 
(1983) warns. Second, as Michel Loriaux (2005) points out, there is a 
confrontation between «demometry» and «demology» in which the for-
mer refers to measurement of phenomena and their frequency, and the 
latter to the construction of theories starting from empirical observa-
tion. At the same time, demography is defined by the robustness of its 
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quantitative methodology. Hence incursions from the field into qualita-
tive analysis are relatively few and mostly limited to studying the dis-
course of individuals in order to understand demographic behaviour. 
Very few attempts have been made to understand the conceptualisation 
of demographic phenomena and their instrumental use in the political 
sphere, which is the aim of the present paper. 
This article should be seen, then, as a first approximation in an ongoing 
project that aims to examine, from the standpoint of demography, the 
transformation that has been occurring in political, legal and fictional 
discussion of demographic evolution in general, and twenty-first-centu-
ry migrations in particular. Its specific goal is to analyse changes in the 
concept of migrations as a risk, which is the scenario presented in neo-
liberal discourse after the onset of the 2008 economic crisis in Europe. 
The Global Risks reports, published annually from 2006 to the present 
by the World Economic Forum, are the main source used in this project 
since they provide a way of assessing the changes occurring in a dis-
course that is, in fact, shaping perceptions of population evolution in 
general, and migration in particular, as being among the key risks that 
must be identified, managed and monitored in order to ensure global 
governability. The findings of these reports are used in the present anal-
ysis as a discursive map on which to pinpoint the key concepts used in 
the neoliberal approach to migration. 
In the following sections I shall give a more detailed account of this 
source and its approach to these issues, after which I shall analyse the 
discussion about population growth and structure in general, and then 
about migration in particular. The development of the concept of «resil-
ience» as it appears in these reports and the way it is applied to popula-
tion and migration will then be examined, a focus which, as I shall show, 
is essential for understanding this conceptual evolution. 
Sources and methodology 
The Global Risks reports have been published by the World Economic 
Forum (WEF) on an annual basis since 2006, always with support from 
private entities associated with insurance companies and research cen-
tres, or university departments specialising in the analysis of global 
risks. Founded in 1971 by Klaus Schwab, Professor of Business Policy at 
the University of Geneva, the WEF, «an international institution commit-
ted to improving the state of the world through public-private coopera-
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tion in the spirit of global citizenship» (www.weforum.org), is a non-
governmental organisation based in Cologny (Switzerland). While the 
original aim of the WEF was to foster the spread of American business 
culture in Europe, it has now become a key reference in global govern-
ance and, it might be said, one of the world’s most influential generators 
of neoliberal thought and policy. One of its most conspicuous activities is 
the Davos Meeting in January each year, to which individuals deemed to 
be world leaders in different spheres (business, political and academic) 
are invited to discuss the perceived burning issues of the past year and 
those foreseen in coming years. It is also the occasion on which the an-
nual Global Risks report is presented. The aim of these reports, as Klaus 
Schwab says in his Preface to the 2015 edition, has always been «to shed 
light on global risks and help create a shared understanding of the most 
pressing issues, the ways they interconnect and their potential negative 
impacts» (WEF, 2015, p. 6). The Introduction adds that for the past dec-
ade, the Global Risks report «has been calling attention to global risks 
and providing tools to support decision-makers in their efforts to miti-
gate or prevent global risks or strengthen resilience against them» 
(WEF, 2015, p. 10). 
The ten reports published so far include among their backers the insur-
ance companies Marsh & McLennan and Swiss Reinsurance Company 
Ltd, together with the Wharton Risk Management and Decision Process-
es Center at the University of Pennsylvania. The latter is a research cen-
tre which promotes public policies to deal with risks of low probability 
but catastrophic consequences. In all the reports, Howard Kunreuther, 
Professor of Decision Sciences and Business Economics and Public Poli-
cy at the centre, appears as its representative. Merrill Lynch (active in 
Bank of America Merrill Lynch Healthcare Banking inter alia) partici-
pated in the 2006 report, as did Citigroup (which runs the world’s larg-
est financial services network and was the among the first companies to 
integrate financial and insurance services) in 2010, while the insurance 
company Zurich Financial Services has been involved since 2008. 
On the academic side, the National University of Singapore and the Ox-
ford Martin School at Oxford University have worked with the group in 
the last three years. It is noteworthy that part of the National University 
of Singapore team was trained at the Wharton Risk Center of the Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania. The Oxford Martin School is a prestigious insti-
tution specialising in risk forecasting and analysis. Prior to becoming its 
director in 2006, Professor Ian Goldin was well known in his career as a 
financial manager, vice-president of the World Bank (2003-2006) and, 
before that, Chief Executive and Managing Director of the Development 
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Bank of Southern Africa (1996-2003). His recent work has focused on 
the role of demography as a tool for predicting the future with regard to 
migration (2011) and, subsequently, overpopulation (2014). However, 
the involvement of these two academic institutions has not entailed any 
substantial change in research methodology. Rather, they would seem to 
influence the conceptualisation and presentation of risk-related phe-
nomena and risks themselves, and to underpin some areas in which 
different participants are specialists or have previously shown interest, 
for example Professor Goldin and his work on demographic phenomena. 
The Global Risks reports are essentially based on analysis of the results 
of a global risk perception survey which is addressed to selected experts 
from the business, political and academic spheres – with numbers vary-
ing from 400 in 2006 to more than 700 in 2014 – who are asked about a 
number of previously identified global risks (between 25 and 50) in five 
different categories: economic, environmental, geopolitical, social and 
technological. They are asked to order them hierarchically, assess their 
probability and impact, and hypothesise relations among them over the 
coming ten years. The survey concludes with two open questions, the 
first concerning risks not envisaged in the questionnaire and, the sec-
ond, about any additional issue that could potentially emerge as a seri-
ous risk of global concern in the future. The information thus gathered is 
processed in three main ways: establishing a hierarchy of risks, mapping 
their interconnections, and studying them in terms of impact and prob-
ability. Then there is a section on risks identified as either emerging or 
unanticipated. 
It is not my intention to evaluate the adequacy of the methodology – 
based on analysis of networks of concepts established for different sce-
narios according to the responses of the interviewees – or to consider 
the veracity of the data gleaned from the surveys on which the Global 
Risks reports are based, or even to examine the fit between data and 
interpretation. Instead, I shall analyse how discussion that shapes the 
presentation of this data ends up offering a specific image of population 
evolution as a risk or, in other words, transforming population evolu-
tion, structure and dynamics into a risk. This entails, first, analysing key 
population-related concepts starting from their context and, second, 
bringing to light the narrative line of this particular exposition. The un-
derlying hypothesis of my approach is that the resulting account is 
geared to imposing ideas (in this case concerning demography), produc-
ing meaning and eventually influencing conduct (especially of policy 
makers) in a process that Salmon (2007) has called «storytelling» or, in 
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other words, a re-conceptualisation of reality imposed by neoliberalism 
by dint of producing its own narrative technique. 
A close look at the use of different population-related concepts may help 
to shed light on the shift in neoliberal discourse in the WEF reports on 
risk management, which is seen as the mainstay of global governability. 
In this case, «governability» should be understood as the set of devices 
that guarantee population management (Foucault, 1983). The message 
is not expressed in terms of a political position or economic theory but 
is manifested, rather, in the evaluation/construction of risk. This desire 
to present the findings of the reports as an «objective product» of scien-
tific methodology, and the collective method of detecting possible risks 
by means of the aforementioned survey of experts are interesting be-
cause the concept of «discourse» whose «author» is embodied in a vir-
tual individual – and here I would concur with the so called «anti-hu-
manistic» perspective of Michel Foucault (1973) – does not figure any-
where as the unit of analysis in the WEF reports. It should also be point-
ed out that the reports never contemplate any analysis of the meaning of 
the experts’ responses. Their opinions about present reality (and future 
trends) are the main source and taken as objectively characterising real-
ity. This kind of analysis brings population evolution closer to the social 
imaginary, or a set of mental representations that end up informing and 
transforming social reality, as in the paradigm of the «imaginary institu-
tion of societies» described by Cornelius Castoriadis (1983). 
Population as a risk: Evolution of a concept 
In order to understand the evolution of the portrayal of population and 
migrations as a risk, one must – albeit briefly – refer to the theoretical 
framework of the Risk Society, where risk is understood as a future 
event that may appear as a threat. As a permanent menace, it deter-
mines our lives and expectations and therefore ends up invading our 
minds and governing our actions. The essential difference between this 
and catastrophe is temporal. The catastrophe has already happened, 
while risk is always lurking in the threat that something is going to hap-
pen and, accordingly, as a potential future event. Furthermore, risk 
needs some kind of staging in order to be perceived as such and also 
entails decision-making. This raises the question of who decides what 
constitutes a risk or, alternatively and in brief, who constructs the dis-
course that transforms a particular phenomenon into a risk (Beck, 
2009). 
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When Ulrich Beck formulated his risk society theory in 1986, he did so 
thinking about a more equitable distribution of the costs that might be 
occasioned by phenomena perceived by citizens and State as a risk. In 
this case, the State, as guarantor of security, shouldered responsibility 
for precautionary risk containment and distributing the costs of conse-
quences and also expenditure deriving from individual decisions, while 
simultaneously making the individual participate in prevention. Evoking 
Ernst Bloch’s The Principle of Hope, Beck remarked much later that de-
velopment of his theory would imply a utopian viewpoint (Beck, 2013). 
With hindsight, one can state that demographic evolution and, in partic-
ular, its growth has been conceptualised as a risk, at least since the pub-
lication of Thomas Robert Malthus’ An Essay on the Principle of Popula-
tion in 1798. Ever since then, it has never ceased to be perceived as a 
threat and a concern that is reflected in the emergence of dystopian the-
ses produced by scientists and politicians alike. The most outstanding 
exponent here is Paul Ehrlich and his book The Population Bomb (1968). 
There have also been echoes in works of fiction (see Domingo, 2008), a 
recent example being Dan Brown’s novel Inferno (2013). After the 
1980s and the slowing of population growth, the evolution of population 
in general is still seen as a risk, or an unpremeditated or perhaps «natu-
ral» catastrophe – not unlike a tsunami – but also as an ambiguous phe-
nomenon with disadvantages and benefits unequally distributed among 
different countries (depending on their situation in terms of demo-
graphic transition), between individuals and State in any one country 
(in accordance with the distribution of costs occasioned by a catastro-
phe), and also among individuals (in keeping with basic sociodemo-
graphic characteristics such as gender, age, origin, situation in the family 
cycle or household structure and employment). 
Among the demographic factors perceived as risks, I would emphasise 
three in particular: 1) population growth; 2) structure by age; and 3) 
migrations. The hegemonic discourse has labelled immigration as an 
erroneous (or insufficient) solution to the challenge presented by popu-
lation ageing, as argued in the controversial report published in 2000 by 
the United Nations Population Division, Replacement Migration, Is It a 
Solution to Declining and Ageing Populations? Despite all the provisos 
offered by the authors and a considerable range of forceful criticisms of 
the report’s point of view (Coleman, 2001; Weiner, Teitelbaum, 2001, 
inter alia), migration is still generally presented either as a palliative to 
the relative scarcity of young people, a view which places population 
ageing under the heading of natural catastrophe, or a response to the 
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inability of national labour markets to absorb them in countries which 
have relatively new infrastructures. 
Along these lines, one finds opinions by individuals who are both well 
known and, in ideological terms, very different (Domingo, 2014), rang-
ing from the most conservative proponents of Malthusianism like Gio-
vanni Sartori and Gianni Mazzolenni (2003) through to individuals voic-
ing different opinions in the ecologist movement, amongst whom one 
might cite the renowned author James Lovelock (2007 and 2010) and, in 
recent years, coinciding with the fact that the world’s population now 
exceeds the figure of seven billion inhabitants, new writers such as Ste-
phen Emmott (2013), to name just a few. As for studies directly address-
ing migration, one could single out such works as Jean-Claude Chesnais’ 
Le crépuscule de l’Occident. Démographie et politique (1995), or Samuel 
Huntington’s influential clash-of-civilisations (populations) paradigm 
(1993, 1996 and 2004). 
The Global Risks reports give the impression that the evolution of popu-
lation has become an increasingly pressing concern. This is partly due to 
the fact that the three demographic factors I have mentioned above 
were always hovering in the background of global risks studies. Moreo-
ver, before the present crisis, the immediacy and repercussions of other 
risks had eclipsed demographic phenomena which were characterised 
more by their power of inertia, especially with regard to growth and 
structure, than by any prognosis of their spectacular nature or impact 
ten years on. In any case, demographic evolution does not appear to 
have been listed as one of the five top risks until 2009 when it appears 
specifically with regard to immigration and under the «Social» heading. 
In order to offer a clear illustration of the evolution and treatment of 
demographic phenomena in the different WEF reports, Table 1 takes 
material from 2007 to 2015 showing the most serious risks in terms of 
probability and impact every year. Probable risks are first classified as 
«societal risks» (including demographic risks) and eventually demo-
graphic phenomena appear as risks per se. Before discussing this evolu-
tion, I would point out that information about the risks identified in each 
edition as well as their place in the hierarchy is patchy and unsystemat-
ic, so the approximation offered by Table 1 is quite partial. For example, 
in years when demographic phenomena do not appear in the first five 
places of the hierarchy of risks, there is no exact description of the place 
they occupy. Neither is there any systematic information regarding 
when and how the most serious risks are related with demographic 
phenomena, unless this is specifically mentioned in the reports. 
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The first thing one sees is that, like public opinion in general, the ex-
perts’ views tend to reflect the impact of the most momentous phenom-
ena of the previous year. Hence, the avian influenza pandemic appeared 
in the 2007 report as a pre-eminent social risk in terms of impact, asset 
price collapse headed the list of concerns in the three years following 
the onset of the crisis while, in the 2015 report, «interstate conflicts 
with regional consequences» (p. 16) in Syria and Ukraine was a para-
mount risk. It is possible that, since the surveys for each report are car-
ried out at the beginning of the year, thus embracing the newsworthy 
events of the previous year, the 2016 report will again feature fear of 
pandemics among social risks owing to the gravity and repercussions of 
the outbreak of Ebola virus disease at the end of 2014 (which appears in 
the 2015 report). This said, it should be noted that demographic phe-
nomena appeared for the first time as risks in their own right in the 
2008 report (with regard to ageing), in 2009 (referring to migration) 
and in 2011 (as a general «likelihood» issue dubbed «demographic chal-
lenges»). Prior to this, their presence was al-ways subsidiary, cited as a 
cause or consequence of some non-demo-graphic risk. For example, 
population growth (or density) systematically appears in relation with 
environmental risks as an aggravating factor of extreme weather, water 
scarcity or biodiversity loss, to give a few outstanding examples, or 
when, in the domain of economics, the risk of «retrenchment from glob-
alization» might mean «increased hurdles to cross-border labour migra-
tion», or the financial crisis could be exacerbated by the age structure of 
the population (WEF, 2010). 
An overview of the treatment of population from the standpoint of its 
evolution in the ten years between the publication of the 2006 report 
and that of 2015 shows two striking trends: 1) the divergent paths tak-
en in evaluating population growth and the imbalances presented by 
both its structure by age and migration; and 2) changes in the ways in 
which these phenomena are considered, especially the drastic change, if 
not total turnaround, in the treatment of migrations as a factor of risk. If 
population ageing and migrations were seen as potential risks per se in 
2008 and 2009 respectively, after 2012, it is specified that, rather than 
constituting risks in themselves, the real risk is bad management of both 
phenomena. In 2015, however, they appear as «trends», although they 
also remain as subsidiary factors among risks classified as most proba-
ble or of greatest impact, especially with regard to population growth in 
the cases of the water crisis and migration related with interstate con-
flict. 
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TABLE 1 Demography and evolving risk: An overview (2007-2015) 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Likelihood Breakdown 
of critical 
informa-
tion infras-
tructure 
Asset price 
collapse 
Asset price 
collapse 
Asset price 
collapse 
Storms and 
cyclones 
Severe in-
come dis-
parity 
Severe in-
come dis-
parity 
Income dis-
parity 
Interstate 
conflicts 
regional 
conse-
quences 
Impact Asset price 
collapse 
Asset price 
collapse 
Asset price 
collapse 
Asset price 
collapse 
Fiscal crisis Major sys-
temic fi-
nancial 
crisis 
Major sys-
temic fi-
nancial 
crisis 
Fiscal crisis Water cri-
sis 
1st societal 
risk (likely-
hood) 
Chronic 
deseases in 
developed 
countries 
Chronic 
deseases in 
developed 
countries 
Chronic 
deseases 
Chronic 
deseases 
Demo-
graphic 
challenge 
Severe in-
come dis-
parity 
Misman-
agement of 
population 
ageing 
Income dis-
parity 
Interstate 
conflicts 
regional 
conse-
quences 
1st societal 
risk (im-
pact) 
Pandemics Pandemics Chronic 
deseases 
Chronic 
deseases 
Water 
scarcity 
Food shor-
tages cities 
Water sup-
ply crisis 
Income dis-
parity 
Water 
crisis 
Demogra-
phy 
 Ageing po-
pulation in 
developed 
countries 
Migration Migration Population 
«cluster 
bombs» 
Misman-
agement of 
population 
ageing 
Misman-
agement of 
population 
ageing 
Misman-
agement of 
population 
ageing 
Large-scale 
involuntary 
migration 
     Global 
graying 
Unman-
aged mi-
gration 
Unman-
aged mi-
gration 
Unman-
aged mi-
gration 
Ageing po-
pulation 
(trend) 
     Demo-
graphic 
dividends 
Unsustain-
able popu-
lation 
growth 
Unsustain-
able popu-
lation 
growth 
Unsustain-
able popu-
lation 
growth 
Rising geo-
graphic 
mobility 
(trend) 
Note: In the years 2008, 2011 and 2015 demographic phenomena appear as general trends or poten-
tial risks to watch, although «Migration» in 2011 and its reformulation as «Unmanaged migra-
tion» in 2015 remain present. The same might be said of population ageing. 
Source: Compiled by the author from the World Economic Forum’ Global Risks reports 2007 to 2014. 
Population growth and structure: The malthusian view 
The construction of population growth as a factor of risk remains within 
the framework of Malthusian orthodoxy, which suggests a long-standing 
mismatch between the expanding population and the investment in ag-
riculture deemed necessary to increase productivity and meet the de-
mand for food occasioned by this growth. In the short term, it is pre-
sented as a threat to biodiversity and the sustainability of ecosystems, 
although this is qualified by the observation that the danger lies in the 
combined factors of population growth and continuance of current pat-
terns of consumption. The eventual constant element was that popula-
tion growth appeared as pressure on resources with clear repercussions 
expressed in concepts such as «food security» (WEF, 2008), rising 
greenhouse gas emissions related with climate change (WEF, 2009, 
p. 16), political instability (with particular reference to Afghanistan) and 
stress on water resources (WEF, 2010, p. 8). Population growth and 
economic evolution are listed as detonating factors or multipliers of 
further risks, mainly in the countries with emerging economies (WEF, 
2011). The high point of this line of thought came with the 2012 report 
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when demographic evolution itself in conjunction with fiscal risks was 
presented as a «seed of dystopia» (WEF, 2012, pp. 16-19), a concept that 
was probably underpinned by the UN-orchestrated media staging of 
population growth when 30 October 2011 was selected as the «official» 
birthday of the world’s seven billionth inhabitant. In the 2014 Global 
Risks report, urban population takes over the limelight from global pop-
ulation, with the concomitant assumption that urbanisation will give 
rise to increasingly serious ecological risks as well as growing inequality 
and worsening political instability (WEF, 2014). 
As for structure, distinction must be made between two phenomena, 
first, population ageing and, second, the relationship between demo-
graphic structure, economic development and governability on the 
global scale. Two different aspects of population ageing have been taken 
into account throughout this period, namely its impact on the social se-
curity system in general and increased health sector costs in particular. 
In the former case, population ageing is singled out as a risk in discus-
sion of the effects of the financial crisis and unemployment in social se-
curity systems. The need for a new social contract taking intergenera-
tional transfers as its reference point is now proclaimed, while the non-
sustainability of the pension system owing to the population age struc-
ture is stressed. Hence the issue of ageing is ushered into the 2010 re-
port in the context of the financial crisis and under the heading «The 
implications for social systems: a new social contract for the 21st centu-
ry?» (WEF, 2010, p. 14). According to the authors of the report, this 
breakdown of the system, which was anticipated prior to the crisis with 
causes also preceding it, requires a redistribution of future costs. In oth-
er words, costs must be shared between individuals and the State, which 
is to say between the public and private sectors. Cognizant that such 
measures will be unpopular, the report continues, «The costs of social 
safety nets will have to be better shared among the population and the 
expectations of people in terms of health and pensions will have to be 
realigned. This may require politicians to implement unpopular deci-
sions at a time when voters are suffering from the hardship of high un-
employment caused by the global recession» (WEF, 2010, p. 14). How-
ever, there is no mention of what these measures might be. With regard 
to health in particular, progressive ageing is held responsible for rising 
health sector costs associated with the morbidity (chronic illnesses) and 
mortality characterising what is now dubbed a «silent» pandemic (WEF, 
2010, p. 24). Ageing in the developed countries will continue to be 
viewed as the sword of Damocles hanging over present and future gen-
erations because of the «rising challenge of fiscal stress caused by un-
funded liabilities linked to ageing societies», thus jeopardising the sus-
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tainability of social security (WEF, 2011, p. 19). Although it is asserted 
that, when properly managed, ageing can also be seen as an opportunity 
for society and businesses, it is also claimed more specifically that the 
sustained rise in longevity and upward trend in obesity levels constitute 
a burden because of their contribution to increasing public health costs 
and their repercussion in terms of pensions (WEF, 2014). 
Finally, I would emphasise that, since the 2011 report, the linking-up of 
possible risks arising from age-based structures of the population with 
economic development has been ever more apparent. Besides global 
ageing, the effects of the «demographic dividend» for economically 
emerging countries with regard to the sustainability or otherwise of a 
growing number of working-age individuals and, in particular, the pro-
gressive entry of young people into the job market, are henceforth taken 
into account. This perspective coincides with a geopolitical distribution 
which, considering the situation of each country in terms of demograph-
ic transition, has been presented by some writers, for example Jack A. 
Goldstone (2010), who in some ways call into question the Huntington 
paradigm of The Clash of Civilizations based on virtual ethno-cultural 
categories distinguishing between developed (post-transitional) coun-
tries, those with emerging economies (in the process of transition), and 
developing (pre-transitional) economies, as was recently reflected in the 
2012 report. The different demographic contexts thus identified find a 
nexus in migration, starting with flows of people from country to city, 
and continuing with international migration. The absence of adequate 
channels (which is to say policies) for regulating the surplus of young 
people and the demand for them is identified as the leading cause of 
irregular migration. Hence, some ambivalence is evident when it comes 
to evaluating migration, which can be viewed as a remedy (for both 
emitting and host countries), or a complication. 
Migrations: From problem to solution 
As I have remarked above, the 2009 report – in which a notable feature 
is awareness of the global nature of the economic crisis and the need, 
therefore, to revamp the financial structure and also prevent «over-
regulation» (p. 3) – is the first to pigeonhole a demographic phenome-
non, and migrations in particular, as pre-eminent risks. In this report, 
the only information explicitly presenting migratory movements as a 
risk – whether with regard to illegal workers or movements of refu-
gees – is a disturbing association with terrorism and direct military con-
flict (WEF, 2009, p. 24). Similarly, Table 1 shows that, after 2012, «Mis-
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management of population ageing» replaces the earlier concept of «Age 
structure», while «Migration» becomes «Unmanaged migration», which 
the report defines as «Mass migration driven by resources scarcity, en-
vironmental degradation and lack of opportunity, security or social sta-
bility» (p. 43). This subtle shift from phenomenon itself to management-
of-phenomenon opens the door to another perception which could give 
a completely different meaning to migration and population ageing, 
even while they are still portrayed as potential risks. 
An abyss yawns between this highly negative perception and the posi-
tion that appears after 2012, which ends up presenting migration as a 
solution in the 2014 report. What brought about this change? In the 
short term, it may be seen as a response to the immediate effects of the 
crisis. One explanation lies with rising migratory pressures after the 
Arab Spring and evidence of the inability of the European Union to satis-
fy the demand, thus jeopardising the Schengen Agreement. Then again, 
there is awareness that emigration is an understandable response to 
inefficient systems of production in developing countries which fail to 
absorb the young population in excess. It is also noted that developed 
countries like Spain, Greece, Portugal and Italy which, particularly af-
fected by unemployment caused by the economic crisis, have «empty» 
young generations because they have gone back to being migrant ex-
porters. In the long term, unavoidable population ageing has again 
raised the need – once the crisis is over – to acquire a workforce, a po-
tential that already appears as a trend in the case of the highly skilled 
workforce. This, in fact, is leading to substantial competition between 
different parts of the developed world and a growing demand foreseen 
for the emerging economies (presently viewed as possible exporters). 
The risk here is the misfit between migratory movements resulting from 
unemployment and, in both countries of origin and host countries, poli-
cies pertaining to migration and development aid. The toughening of 
migration policies during the years of crisis and the expanding informal 
sector are taken as factors that swell the ranks of illegal immigrants as 
well as presenting long-term obstacles to filling jobs in some sectors 
because of a shortage of workers with certain levels of training when 
the envisaged economic recovery occurs. It is suggested that policies 
encouraging the «return of the educated diaspora as a tool for develop-
ment or making the ability of countries to attract immigrants a badge of 
success» (WEF, 2010, pp. 16-17) should be considered. One of the more 
stalwart proponents of the positive view of migration which has been 
gaining ground in the reports since 2012 is the Professor of Globalisa-
tion and Development and Director of the Oxford Martin School, Ian 
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Goldin, who has been one of the authors of the reports since 2012. Gold-
in sees migration as a mechanism for rectifying economic inequalities 
(Goldin, 2014) and, from this standpoint, considers that the best way of 
correcting «unmanaged» or «mismanaged migration» is none other than 
the need for «global leadership» capable of imposing a liberal agenda 
that will guarantee the priority of free movement over «national» inter-
ests (Goldin, 2011). 
Special attention should be given to the question of the «lost genera-
tion», generally defined by the economic parameter since its members 
are victims of the crisis while still young. They are also characterised by 
the technological variable because they are the first generation of «digi-
tal natives». Rising education costs, increasing unemployment and job 
insecurity, as well as the impact of all this on careers are the main 
threats they must face. Once again, the variety of demographic and eco-
nomic contexts is discussed in order to understand the situations of 
different groups of young people: in the developed countries (where the 
risk is rupture of the intergenerational social contract), in emerging 
countries (where the impact seems somewhat mitigated, although the 
growing urban population and the leap from tradition to ultra-moder-
nity means a generational standoff) and, finally, in developing countries 
(in which frustrations among young people arising from the gap be-
tween expectations and the actual job offer, combined with political 
conditions, typify situations of the kind that led to the Arab Spring). Alt-
hough the relative scarcity of young people and its possible effects on 
the future demand in the job market may appear in the medium and 
long term as a solution for young workers in future, the youth of today 
seems condemned to instability, low wages, scant productivity and the 
informal economy. Accordingly, political instability is raised as a WEF 
concern. Now, for the first time, migration is presented more as a solu-
tion than as a problem, although with two major provisos: it applies to 
highly skilled workers and is also subject to the subsequent return of 
skilled emigrants to their countries of origin (WEF, 2014, p. 38). As Mas-
simo Livi-Bacci (2010) warns, advocating temporary and circular migra-
tion as the only solution, presented as a way of maximising remittances 
and combating the brain drain and thus appeasing the countries of 
origin, also means curbing the migrant’s freedom, obstructing settle-
ment in the host country and, incidentally, cutting back on every possi-
ble social service cost. 
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From prevention to resilience 
The geographer Ash Amin (2012) has pointed out how, during the first 
decade of the twenty-first century, discussion about the Risk Society has 
significantly changed with a shift from «prevention» to «resilience». 
Instead of situating contemporary societies as belonging to a welfare 
economy emphasising economic progress and equitable redistribution 
of benefits and costs, as Ulrich Beck advocated, the new neoliberal logic 
views populations and individuals from a narrower perspective of their 
contribution to competition on a global scale and what they cost. This 
framework, which draws on completely opposing political traditions to 
define both risk society and resilience, in fact expresses a deeper-rooted 
position advocating lines of deregularisation which began with the crisis 
of 1973. In Amin’s opinion, acceptance of this stance would have been 
favoured by a whole series of natural and social phenomena understood 
as catastrophes, starting with terrorist attacks (11 September 2001, 
Madrid 2004, London 2005), natural disasters (the tsunami that lashed 
the coasts of Southeast Asia in December 2004, Hurricane Katrina in 
New Orleans in August 2005, the eruption of the volcano in Iceland in 
2010 and the nuclear crisis resulting from the tsunami that hit the 
coasts of Japan in March 2011), and the avian influenza epidemics be-
tween 2004 and 2006, together with the effects of the financial crisis 
following the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in 2008, all of which have 
played their part in this change of discourse. Given the proliferation of 
risks and the difficulties of long-term prediction, the new standpoint 
now accepts them as inevitable, endowing them with a catastrophic 
character and turning to strategies of minimisation and mitigation in-
stead of prevention and avoidance. In Ash Amin’s view, use of the con-
cept of resilience in this context moves away from a focus on the pro-
tected society towards a self-defence society in which citizens and pub-
lic organisms appear as agents of intervention, knowledge managers 
and architects of reconstruction. 
The World Economic Forum Global Risks reports provide a splendid 
compass for anyone wishing to monitor the drift of the shift. The term 
«resilience» appears in the 2006 report as a strategy of risk mitigation 
applied in equal measure to both institutions and society without identi-
fying any population in particular. The concept of resilience appears in 
the Introduction as an undefined strategy (which remained undefined 
until 2012, as noted below) for mitigating future risks by «strengthening 
the capacity and resilience of business and political and administrative 
institutions at all levels» (WEF, 2006, p. 1). «Mitigation» is identified 
Migration as a Global Risk: 
The avolving approach of the world economic forum 
112 
here as the first response to global risks, in the understanding that, 
«Mitigation covers a range of actions, from prevention – where possi-
ble – and preparation for risk events» (WEF, 2006, p. 9). From the very 
beginning, it is clearly linked with private sector participation: «[T]here 
is scope for more widespread and effective initiative by the private sec-
tor. Incentives need to be properly aligned to make risk mitigation as 
much about proactive prevention as about reactive recovery» (WEF, 
2006, p. 1). This report also contains the only development of the idea of 
resilience as a capacity to be promoted in the business world in particu-
lar (p. 13). 
This is a management strategy based more on the way the concept of 
resilience has been developed from the business perspective than on the 
way it was reshaped as it moved from physics (analysis of the behaviour 
and property of specific materials) into the social sciences (Martin-
Breen, and Anderies, 2011). It reappeared in the market context (identi-
fying the resilience of exports as a way of trying to counterbalance the 
disruption of the financial markets), referring to the financial system 
itself (as the capacity to resist both the buffeting of the crisis and as a 
way of returning to the previous «normality» or finding a new balance), 
to the proper management of chains of distribution (WEF, 2008), to the 
effectiveness of fiscal or monetary responses, and to governance and 
regulation (WEF, 2010). It is only when dealing with climate change that 
it acquires a national dimension but, even so, «resilience» always refers 
to the economy and not populations. It is linked with the population 
only indirectly, in the discussion about how much needs to be invested 
in infrastructure when considering the dependence of the population 
and organisations on its proper functioning. It is clear, however, that the 
overriding concern is always the resilience of the system (WEF, 2010, 
p. 13). 
The 2013 report is all about resilience and now, for the first time, this 
extends to the whole planet from the environmental perspective. More 
important, a special section is devoted to national resilience. The meta-
phor used, that of the «perfect storm», synthesises the overriding con-
cern of the clash between economic risks (resulting from the economic 
crisis) and environmental risks (aggravated by the effects of the eco-
nomic crisis) and – ignoring the connection between them – resilience at 
the national level. For the first time, too, an attempt is made to define 
the concept of resilience in more detail, recognising its origins in engi-
neering and its diffusion into many other scientific disciplines – without 
going any deeper than that – to end up expanding the definition that had 
previously been given in the 2012 report so that, in the 2013 report, a 
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resilient country becomes «one that has the capability to 1) adapt to 
changing contexts, 2) withstand sudden shocks and 3) recover to a de-
sired equilibrium, either the previous one or a new one, while preserv-
ing the continuity of its operations» (WEF, 2013, p. 37). 
The growing prominence of the concept of «resilience» reached a peak 
in the 2014 report when, starting from its executive summary, resilience 
and its construction appear as the ultimate aim of this and subsequent 
reports. Resilience is viewed primarily as the product of good govern-
ment, understood as proper management of factors of risk. The devel-
opment of the concept is closely linked with that of vulnerability, with 
special attention to populations. The emphasis on young people and 
minorities as particularly vulnerable, at least in terms of employment 
since the onset of the economic crisis, changes to an accent subsequent-
ly given to the so-called «lost generation» – approximately defined as 
the cohort aged between 13 and 23 in 2013 – and also, but much less 
categorically and only sketchily, to policies aimed at integrating migrant 
populations into the urban population (WEF, 2014, p. 33). Resilience is 
no longer viewed as exclusively referring to the economic system or as 
an integral part of it but it is now also applied to a human population. In 
other words, referring to the «lost generation» – explicitly mentioning 
young people from the Middle East and also from Spain and Greece – the 
diagnosis leads to a series of measures aimed at rescuing or, in other 
words, «building the resilience» of these people. The first of these 
measures is reform of the educational system, which means extending 
schooling for young people in developing countries, and revamping uni-
versity syllabuses in developed countries with a view to enhancing 
competitiveness. Also mentioned as a desirable aim in this sphere is 
working with the private sector, which, the authors say, should make it 
easier for young people to find jobs and put an end to over-qualification 
and precarious working conditions (WEF, 2014, p. 35). The second pro-
posal is that leaders should change their approach so as «to find ways to 
engage the young generation», which is described as distrusting authori-
ties and institutions: «Anti-austerity movements and other protests give 
voice to an increasing distrust in current socioeconomic and political 
systems. The young are an important constituent of the general disap-
pointment felt in many nations with regional and global governance 
bodies such as the EU and the International Monetary Fund (IMF)» 
(WEF, 2014, p. 36). This programme geared to fostering the participa-
tion of young people in social and political institutions then presents 
their present precarious situation as a product of intergenerational ten-
sion caused by growing numbers of old people and the corresponding 
pressure on welfare systems. The problem is formulated in the form of 
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questions: «What can be done to mitigate intergenerational tension aris-
ing from demographic and economic pressures on welfare systems? 
How can the millennial and post-millenial generations be socially better 
protected?» (WEF, 2014, p. 37). The third solution suggested for young 
people in – ageing – developed countries is changing the pension system 
(without specifying how) while, for developing countries and those of 
the south of Europe subject to austerity policies, better management of 
circular migration is recommended. 
Discussion: liaisons dangereuses 
It is essential that today’s demographers should try to break free of the 
web of discourse that is being woven around population in general and 
migrations in particular. If they do not, neoliberal versions will continue 
to hold sway in the struggle for ascendancy over meanings in scientific 
production, subordinating demography and relegating it to the position 
of an auxiliary discipline, while appropriating the intelligibility of demo-
graphic processes and moulding them to justify their own arguments. 
The casting of population evolution in the role of catastrophe is part and 
parcel of an approach by means of which neoliberal discourse has 
sought to use demographic structure and dynamics to give a veneer of 
legitimacy to the imposition of its policies and disciplinary practices 
(Laval, Dardot, 2009). In the story told by the neoliberal economist, 
population ageing appears as a risk that is being passed on to coming 
generations owing to decisions made by individuals not to have 
«enough» children for their own generation, as does inadequate distri-
bution between the individual and the State of responsibility for social 
costs, especially pensions. Migration, which at the start of the millenni-
um was presented as a necessary evil, and not sufficient for correcting 
population ageing, became a solution after the onset of the economic 
crisis, although still showing clearly skewed bias with regard to the mi-
grant’s country of origin and professional skills. This, of course, over-
looks the fact that migration is not only about demand for highly skilled 
individuals, but it is also a matter of individual will (and, accordingly, 
human rights). The latter aspect has disappeared into the mesh of inter-
ests linking the migrants’ states of origin and the host countries. 
In this context, «resilience» appears clearly as a matter of «governance» 
which, from the WEF standpoint, means calling for global institutions. 
Applied to populations in general and migrants in particular, «resili-
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ence» is a matter of classification or, if one prefers, political decision-
making which, as in the case of the «lost generation», has chosen to fo-
cus more on one vulnerable group than on others. Migration can appear 
as a factor of resilience in itself but, once again, this approach is framed 
in political discourse that singles out one type of migrant and overlooks 
others. However, this about-turn in the way in which migration is con-
ceptualised introduces a more disciplinary element, namely control as 
part of migration policies – control of individuals, their mobility, and 
responsibility for themselves being the first target – but always in the 
context of «old policies» adopted by the EU in which migration is seen 
exclusively within the framework of the needs of the market, oscillating 
between the proclaimed desire for integration and a progressive hard-
ening of policy. 
If we do not wish demography to be instrumented by neoliberalism, we 
must uphold the discipline’s own discourse on the basis of theoretical 
development which requires the effort of radical, informed criticism of 
any instrumental use being made of it. A project of this scope would 
have to start with three steps. The first would entail the theoretical ef-
fort of thinking in genealogical terms about the origins and evolution of 
demography as a discipline. This would perforce involve a critical re-
view of the concepts and categories used, starting with «population» 
and «reproduction» (demographic and social). It also means bringing to 
light from the demographic standpoint concepts which, while they do 
not strictly pertain to the discipline, are used when thinking about man-
aging populations. «Resilience» is an outstanding example. Second, the 
task of empirical measurement and definition of notions like «lost gen-
eration» which are imposed as «demographic realities» should be car-
ried out by demographers. This would require comparative analysis 
both between different countries and at different points in time. In the 
case of a generation, one would have to compare the number of people 
involved, the composition of this generation in comparison with others 
and the same generation in other countries. Third and finally, thorough-
going criticism of neoliberal discourse from the standpoint of demogra-
phy would presuppose analysis of the mode of scientific production im-
posed on the social sciences in general by the neoliberal framework. I 
refer to a situation in which academics are expected to approach their 
research in accordance with «the demands of the market» and must 
therefore adjust research activity to the competition, subordination to 
the private sector in terms of funding, and evaluation in terms of its abil-
ity to produce short-term benefits or its justification as ideological dis-
course assessed by its media impact. 
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